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Summary. — Previous analyses of the formation and composition of community-based organizations (CBOs) have used cross section
data. So, causal inference has been compromised. We obviate this problem by using data from a quasi-experiment in which villages were
formed by government oﬃcials selecting and clustering households. Our ﬁndings are as follows: CBO co-memberships are more likely
between geographically proximate households and less likely between early and late settlers, members of female-headed households are
not excluded, in poorer villages CBO co-membership networks are denser and, while wealthier households may have been instrumental
in setting up CBOs, poorer households engage shortly afterward.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed a renewed policy interest in
community-based development (Mansuri & Rao, 2004). This
interest is predicated on the idea that community involvement
in the planning and execution of policy interventions leads to
more eﬀective and equitable development. In practice, com-
munity-based interventions are often channeled through Com-
munity-Based Organizations (CBOs). In one critical respect
this practice is well founded: CBOs often emerge and play
an important role in providing public goods and in resolving
collective action problems when formal institutions are deﬁ-
cient (Coleman, 1988; Ostrom, 1990; Putnam, 2000). For this
reason, they are particularly important in poor countries
where the government is unable or unwilling to provide much
needed social services, especially in rural areas (Edwards &
Hulme, 1995; Fafchamps, 2006).
However, whether eﬀective and equitable development can
be achieved by assisting CBOs ultimately depends on their
composition and on where they do and do not emerge. If
CBOs are composed of local elites, interventions channeled
through them are likely to reﬂect the preferences and interests
of those elites (Platteau & Gaspart, 2003). Similarly, if CBOs
form along gender or ethnic lines, their mode of operation is
likely to reﬂect the interests of speciﬁc gender or ethnic groups
rather than the interests of the community as a whole. More
generally, if existing socio-economic cleavages are reﬂected
in the composition of CBOs (by exclusion of individuals
who do not have certain characteristics or through segmenta-
tion) this may negatively aﬀect social cohesion and solidarity
(De Bock, 2014). Finally, if CBOs tend not to emerge in the
poorest communities, then communities in greatest need of
assistance could miss out on important development opportu-
nities. An understanding of the emergence and composition of
CBOs is thus of major policy interest.
Arcand and Fafchamps (2012) investigate CBO membership
and co-membership, i.e., who is linked to whom as a result of
belonging to the same CBOs in Senegal and Burkina Faso.
They ﬁnd that more prosperous members of rural society are
more likely to belong to CBOs and that members of ethnic
groups that traditionally focus on raising livestock rather than
on crop cultivation are less likely to belong to CBOs. They
also ﬁnd that CBO membership is assortative on wealth and
ethnicity, i.e., that the wealthy tend to group with the wealthy
and the poor with the poor, and that diﬀerent ethnic groups
tend not to group together. These are the sort of group forma-
tion patterns that ought to be of potential concern for devel-
opment practitioners.
In common with a large literature on the role of social net-
works in risk and information sharing within agrarian com-
munities of Africa (e.g., De Bock, 2014; De Weerdt, 2004;
Dekker, 2004; Fafchamps & Gubert, 2007; Krishnan &
Sciubba, 2009; Udry & Conley, 2004), Arcand and
Fafchamps (2012) rely on cross-section data. This literature
provides vital descriptive information on group composition,
but cannot always satisfactorily address issues of causality.
Speciﬁcally, it cannot always tell whether similarities cause
people to associate with one another or whether association
causes people to become more similar. 1 The issue of reverse
causation does not arise for gender or ethnicity since these
are, in principle, immutable. But when the characteristics of
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interest are income, wealth, and prosperity broadly deﬁned,
causal ambiguity needs to be resolved. Furthermore, cross-sec-
tion data do not facilitate the identiﬁcation of causal eﬀects
running from community composition to CBO formation,
an issue that arises both for mutable characteristics such as
wealth as well as, via selection eﬀects, for immutable individ-
ual characteristics such as gender and ethnicity.
In this paper, we obviate these concerns by focusing on data
from a de facto quasi-experiment resulting from actions taken
over a quarter of a century ago by the, then, newly formed
Zimbabwean government. After the Zimbabwean war of inde-
pendence in 1980, many people displaced by the ﬁghting were
resettled in newly created villages. These resettled villages were
created by government oﬃcials selecting households from lists
of applicants. 2 Thus, unlike traditional villages that are orga-
nized along kinship lines, these new villages brought together
households that were typically unacquainted with each other,
often of diﬀerent lineage and diverse in terms of wealth
(Dekker, 2004). 3 Yet, in order to survive and prosper, the
inhabitants of these newly created villages had to solve various
collective action problems relating to natural resource man-
agement, risk management, indivisibilities in inputs to agrar-
ian production, and inadequate access to ﬁnancial and other
services. The creation of new villages with households selected
at random forms a quasi-experiment that oﬀers a unique
opportunity to study the community formation process. 4
The nature of the quasi-experiment is similar to the random
assignment of roommates to dorms or classes studied by
Sacerdote (2001) and others (e.g., Lyle, 2007; Shue, 2012) or
to the random assignment of entrepreneurs to judging com-
mittees engineered by Fafchamps and Quinn (2012). The dif-
ference is that we do not use random assignment to study
peer eﬀects but rather to study assorting and group formation
between people who have been randomly brought together.
Perhaps the closest analogy to what we do is the Big Brother
TV show: people from diﬀerent backgrounds are thrown
together into the House, and viewers study the friendships
and cliques they form over time. In this case, the government
of Zimbabwe grouped previously unassociated households
together in new villages and we study the CBOs those house-
holds form over time.
We show that, to varying degrees, the 15 studied villages
addressed collective action problems by setting up CBOs.
We investigate CBO formation using data on the geography
of the newly formed villages, kinship and lineage networks
between resettled households, and the characteristics of the
households at the time of their resettlement. We focus our
analysis on two speciﬁc questions—who groups and who
groups with whom—using only household characteristics at
the time of resettlement. We investigate for how long these
characteristics aﬀect CBO formation and co-membership over
time. We focus our analysis on CBOs that have an economic—
as opposed to purely social—purpose. Earlier analysis
(Barr et al., 2012) shows that co-memberships in these CBOs
are more predictive of group formation in incentivized
lab-type experiments, suggesting that, relative to other
co-memberships, they are stronger and probably more valuable.
We make use of a unique dataset combining information
from multiple sources: a panel survey of households that ran
from1983 to 2000; detailed retrospective data onCBOmember-
ship collected in 2000; genealogical data collected in 1999 and
2001; lineage data collected in 2001 and 2009; and village geog-
raphy data collected in 1999 and 2009. Merging, completing,
and reconciling (to the extent possible) these datasets tookmany
months of work by the authors and researchers in the ﬁeld in
Zimbabwe. To our knowledge this is the ﬁrst dataset on small
farming communities that combines detailed information on
socio-economic characteristics with awide range of intra-village
social ties over such a long period of time.
The analysis reveals that the studied communities do not
appear to be elitist. We ﬁnd that, by the end of 1982, at a time
when almost 90% of sampled households had settled in the
new villages, wealthier households had already formed CBOs
to serve a variety of economic purposes. Poorer households
initially tended not to engage in CBOs but, by 1983, this dif-
ference had disappeared. Wealthier households may have been
the ones who initiated CBOs because clearing land, planting
crops, and building houses on uninhabited land proved easier
for them. What is remarkable is that poorer households were
allowed to join without apparent prejudice as and when their
circumstances allowed.
The analysis further shows that the network of CBO co-
memberships is denser in poorer villages. Why this is the case
is not entirely clear. One possibility is that they had a greater
need to organize in order to address indivisibilities in agrarian
inputs and to cope with risk. This pattern persists throughout
the eighteen post-resettlement years covered by our dataset. In
addition, we ﬁnd strong evidence against the separation of
female- and male-headed households into diﬀerent CBOs.
There is, however, some evidence that the female-headed
households are involved in fewer CBOs. Cause for concern
is raised only by evidence that those who settled early and
those who settled late associate less with one another than
those who settled at the same time. There is also weak evidence
that non-Zimbabwean households are less engaged in CBO
activities. Within these small resettled villages, geographical
proximity aﬀects CBO co-membership only in early years: by
1985 we observe no aﬀect of proximity on who groups with
whom. The eﬀect of kinship on co-membership is similarly
occasional and ephemeral. Shared lineage has no bearing on
co-membership, although, at the community level, we ﬁnd evi-
dence that shared lineage and CBO activity are substitutes.
Since households in our dataset generally had little to no
interaction with one another before they came to the new vil-
lages, these ﬁndings can be fairly safely given a causal interpre-
tation. But there is a downside: given their artiﬁcial creation
process, the study villages are not representative of develop-
ing-country villages in general or even of Zimbabwean vil-
lages. This limitation of the study needs to be born in mind
when considering the external validity of our ﬁndings. It
should be noted, however, that new communities made up
of displaced people are not uncommon in the developing
world, especially in post-conﬂict situations. In this context,
ﬁndings such as ours are both rare and of potential value to
development practitioners.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2 we introduce various hypotheses of interest regarding
CBO formation in resettled villages, and we propose an empir-
ical model that distinguishes between them. In this model co-
membership in CBOs is a function of geographical, social,
and economic proximity. In Section 3 we describe our data
sources in detail. In Section 4 we present descriptive statistics
regarding the evolution of CBO co-memberships between from
1980–2000 in each of the ﬁfteen villages in our sample. In
Section 5 we present estimation results for an extensive series
of regressions corresponding to the speciﬁcation presented in
Section 2. In Section 6 we present a circumspect (owing to the
fact that there are only ﬁfteen villages in our sample) but never-
theless informative analysis of CBO co-membership at the
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village-level. In Section 7, we return to the dyadic analysis
armed with new insights from the village-level analysis and we
investigate what happens when we divide the sample according
to one speciﬁc, village-level characteristic. Finally, in Section 8
we discuss our ﬁndings and consider why they diﬀer from those
of Arcand and Fafchamps (2012) and what this implies for the
generality of each study’s ﬁndings.
2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL
SPECIFICATION
CBOs provide a basis for collective action, in part, because
they allow trust between individual members to develop. Trust
can have diﬀerent origins. It may arise from a shared lineage
or kin group, but we expect this source of trust to be less
important in our study villages, given the way they were
formed. Another possible source, common to all households
in our study, is the prospect of a future in close proximity with
one another. This prospect would generate a need for each
person to develop and maintain a reputation of trustworthi-
ness that, combined with self-interest, may be suﬃcient to sup-
port trust and reciprocation. This hypothesis was articulated
by Posner (1980) and subsequently formalized by Coate and
Ravallion (1993).
Households diﬀer in the cost of joining a CBO, and in the
beneﬁts they can hope to derive. We therefore expect some dif-
ferentiation across households in terms of CBO membership.
First, as pointed out by Arcand and Fafchamps (2012) and
others before them, pre-existing kinship ties and shared lineage
may favor trust-reinforcing altruism. 5 Second, similarity in
socio-economic characteristics such as age, household compo-
sition, or wealth may reduce the costs of developing an
acquaintance on which trust and more valuable forms of asso-
ciation can be built. Third, physical proximity increases the
frequency of chance encounters and reduces the costs of main-
taining regular contact. Fourth, a households’ early arrival in
the village may create a shared sense of pioneering camarade-
rie, resulting in a feeling of entitlement and responsibility in
village aﬀairs. With the arrival of additional households, these
feelings may have turned into resentment toward latecomers
who brought additional pressure on shared resources and
could free ride on collective actions initiated prior to their
arrival.
Turning to the beneﬁts of setting up CBOs, these too vary
across households and villages. We expect poorer households
to ﬁnd indivisibilities in agricultural inputs harder to overcome
on their own. For example, a rich household could aﬀord a
ploughing pair of oxen. But a less fortunate one could only
aﬀord a ploughing pair by sacriﬁcing consumption and a poor
household could not aﬀord one on their own. We also expect
poorer households to have a greater need for informal insur-
ance via risk pooling. We therefore expect rich and poor
households to have diﬀerent interests in CBOs.
The beneﬁts associated with setting up CBOs also depend on
whether alternative mechanisms exist for addressing collective
problems. Forming a CBO signals commitment to a common
cause. Membership fees (in money or in kind) can act as a
material pre-commitment to that cause. However, collective
agreements can also be enforced via kin- or lineage-based
mechanisms involving well-established behavioral norms
enforced through lateral and hierarchical pressure. For kin-
and lineage-based mechanisms to facilitate collective action
in the resettled villages, the kin or lineage network must be suf-
ﬁciently dense. Since settlers were rarely settled with their close
kinfolk, this is unlikely to have played an important role in our
study villages. However, authorities tended to assign to a new
village those settlers coming from the surrounding areas.
Hence the lineage network may have been suﬃciently dense
in some villages. Working with a cross-section of the data used
here along with data from six traditional villages, Barr (2004)
found less CBO membership in villages with denser lineage
networks. This is consistent with CBOs and lineage networks
being substitute bases in the provision of local public goods.
The various hypotheses described above can all be captured
within a dyadic model of link formation of the form proposed
by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) and Arcand and Fafchamps
(2012). The model takes the general form mij ¼ kðxijÞ where mij
is the number of CBO co-memberships that i and j share.
Function kð:Þ depends on a vector xij that includes factors that
aﬀect the number and size of the groups that i and j belong to,
and factors that aﬀect the likelihood that i and j belong to the
same group. More about this later.
When estimating a dyadic regression, the main technical dif-
ﬁculty is to obtain consistent standard errors owing to interde-
pendence across mij s. This interdependence could tempt one
into estimating a joint maximum likelihood function. There
are several problems with this approach, however. First, esti-
mation requires solving a complicated optimization problem
with multiple integrals. This can, in principle, be achieved—
e.g., using the Gibbs algorithm—but at a non-negligible cost
in terms of programing. Second and more importantly, writing
down the joint likelihood function forces the researcher to
specify the functional form of the interaction between observa-
tions. Theoretically, this can improve eﬃciency, but it can also
result in inconsistent estimates if the speciﬁed form of interac-
tion is wrong. So, we opt for one of the simpler and more
transparent approaches applied to analyses of this type.
Among these approaches, the most extensively used are the
quadratic assignment permutation method (QAP), developed
by Krackhardt (1987), and the dyadic robust standard error
regression approach developed by Fafchamps and Gubert
(2007). 6 We use the latter primarily because it easily allows
pooling data across disjoint populations.
The estimation of dyadic models requires some care regard-
ing the way regressors are incorporated (Fafchamps and
Gubert; 2007). In our case, the network matrix M = [mij] is
symmetrical: if i belongs to the same CBO(s) as j, by construc-
tion j also belongs to the same CBO(s) as i, i.e., mij = mji. To
ensure that E[mij] = E[mji] regressors must enter the model in a
symmetric fashion. This condition is satisﬁed by models of the
following form:
mij ¼ b0 þ b1lij þ b2gij þ b3jzi  zjj þ b4ðzi þ zjÞ þ vij þ eij
where lij is a vector of network linkage variables such as kin-
ship and shared lineage, gij is the geographical distance
between i and j, zi is a vector of household characteristics such
as the wealth of i or the year of i’s arrival in the village, vij is a
vector of village ﬁxed eﬀects, eij is the dyadic error term, and
b0, b1, b2, b3 and b4 are the coeﬃcients to be estimated.
A signiﬁcantly positive (negative) b1 coeﬃcient indicates
that the corresponding lij variable increases (reduces) the num-
ber of CBO co-memberships that i and j share. A signiﬁcantly
negative b2 indicates that the number of co-memberships
declines as the geographical distance between i and j increases.
A signiﬁcantly negative (positive) b3 coeﬃcient indicates that
the number of co-memberships that i and j share increases if
they are more (less) similar in zi. A signiﬁcantly positive b4
coeﬃcient identiﬁes a characteristic associated with more
CBO memberships or with memberships in larger CBOs. 7
Finally, if the village ﬁxed eﬀects, vij, are jointly signiﬁcant,
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this indicates that there are village-level diﬀerences in the den-
sity of the CBO networks. To the extent that lij, gij, and zi
aﬀect average group formation and vary across villages, this
is captured in the village ﬁxed eﬀects and this could reduce
the signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients b0, b1, b2, b3 and b4. How-
ever, as mentioned above when discussing the role of lineage,
there is no a priori reason to expect a particular regressor to
have a similar eﬀect at the dyad and village level. In this case,
the inclusion of the village ﬁxed eﬀects can improve eﬃciency
and increase the signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients b0, b1, b2, b3
and b4.
The analysis involves the estimation of a series of dyadic
models using mij as the dependent variable. We also estimate
an alternative linear probability model using dij = 1 if
mij > 0 and =0 if mij = 0 as the dependent variable.
8 We esti-
mate these two models for each year for which we have rele-
vant data, that is, starting with 1982 when village settlement
is nearly complete, and ending with 2000 when insecurity in
Zimbabwe forced us to stop data collection. In all cases, the
regressors relate to the dyadic baseline. This is the point in
time when both households in the dyad are resettled—typi-
cally a year between 1980–84. Regressors are described in
detail in the next sections.
We also conduct a series of village-level linear regressions,
one for each year. Given the small number of observa-
tions—there are only 15 villages in our dataset—this raises
doubts regarding the power of our analysis. In spite of this
shortcoming, one important eﬀect is nonetheless conﬁrmed.
3. DATA SOURCES, SAMPLES AND DEFINITIONS
In 1980, the Government of Zimbabwe aimed at resettling
18.000 displaced households over a period of ﬁve years. By
March 1982, 12 schemes accommodating 5,070 settler families
had been established (Kinsey, 1982) and by 1989 a total of
52,000 families had been relocated (Palmer, 1990). In this
paper we use data on 15 randomly selected villages from 2
of the 12 schemes that were established by March 1982. 9
The two schemes diﬀer from one another in terms of suitability
for agriculture. 10 One of the two selected schemes is compara-
ble to two of the schemes established in the same period, while
the second is comparable to six other schemes. The remaining
four schemes are situated in environments less suitable for
crop production (Kinsey, 1982) and are not included in our
analysis.
Resettled households started to arrive in the ﬁfteen sample
villages in 1980 (see Table 1). The inﬂow peaked in 1981 and
almost 90% of sample households had settled by the end of
1982. After 1982 the household composition of each village sta-
bilized. There were a few more arrivals—generally people who
applied for resettlement in 1980 but had not been allocated
land immediately. There were very few departures. When a
household head died during the study period, their farm typi-
cally passed to members of their family, either to their surviv-
ing wife or to one of their sons. Heirs inherited the right to farm
the ﬁelds, to use common grazing lands, and to reside in the
family homestead. We treat these cases as the survival of a
dynastic household. In our data a household is regarded as
having left when the family vacated land and homestead, either
following the death of a household head or for some other rea-
son. There are 504 households in the dataset with at most 499
appearing in the villages at any one time. Village size varies.
The smallest village only has thirteen households throughout
most of the time period covered by our data. The largest
reached a maximum of 52 households in 1998.
The data we use for the analysis in this paper combines
information on the same households from multiple sources.
The socio-economic variables are drawn from the Zimbabwe
Rural Household Dynamics Study (ZRHDS). The ZRHDS
started in March 1983 and aimed to include all the households
present in our study villages at that time. 11 From the ﬁrst
round of the ZRHDS we extract data on: livestock holdings
upon arrival in the village; the age, sex, and education of the
household head; the headcount size of each household upon
arrival; and whether the household resided in a village placed
under curfew by the UDI government during the war. We
regard this last variable as a rough proxy for the intensity of
ﬁghting in the household’s previous place of residence. In Zim-
babwe, livestock is kept as a store of wealth and a productive
asset and sometimes as part of a mixed farming system. We
therefore use livestock holdings as an indicator of initial
wealth. Livestock is measured in oxen-equivalent, with weights
for diﬀerent categories of animals constructed from 1995 mar-
ket prices.
Subsequent survey rounds conducted between 1987–2000
revisited the households interviewed in 1983. 12 As a result,
they do not include the late arrivals. These were identiﬁed
and surveyed by us in 1999, in a single comprehensive survey
round in which respondents were asked to recall the time of
their arrival in the village and some of the characteristics of
their households at that time.
Table 2 summarizes the characteristics and livestock hold-
ings on arrival of the household heads residing in the study vil-
lages in 1980, 1982, and 1984. 13 The average livestock
holdings at the time of resettlement were 3.2—equivalent to
a pair of oxen, one milking cow, and a few chickens. 38% of
households arrived with no livestock at all. They would have
faced the prospect of clearing land and cultivating at least a
ﬁrst set of crops without a ploughing pair of their own. 14
Table 1. Households resettling in and departing from the 15 villages year-
by-year
Year No. settling No. departing No. of
households
in villages
% of full
sample in
villages (%)
1980 161 0 161 31.9
1981 189 0 350 69.4
1982 101 0 451 89.5
1983 17 0 468 92.9
1984 2 0 470 93.3
1985 6 1 475 94.2
1986 2 2 475 94.2
1987 6 0 481 95.4
1988 4 0 485 96.2
1989 2 0 487 96.6
1990 1 1 487 96.6
1991 2 0 489 97.0
1992 4 0 493 97.8
1993 0 0 493 97.8
1994 1 0 494 98.0
1995 1 0 495 98.2
1996 2 0 497 98.6
1997 1 0 498 98.8
1998 2 1 499 99.0
1999 0 0 499 99.0
2000 0 0 499 99.0
Totals 504 5
Source: ZRHDS.
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The age of the average household head in 1980 was 38 years.
Later arrivals tended to be a little older. The average house-
hold size was between ﬁve and six members in 1980. Figures
for subsequent years indicate either that late arrivals had lar-
ger households or that households expanded after resettlement
through procreation or in-migration.
Data on CBOs were collected in 2000 during a six-week per-
iod of intensive ﬁeldwork involving Barr and a small team of
ﬁeld researchers (see Barr, 2004). 15 The objective was to col-
lect comprehensive data on civil social activity at the time
and in the preceding two decades. Considerable thought went
into designing a ﬁeldwork protocol to maximize data quality.
Using the Local Level Institutions Study (World Bank, 1998)
as template, we designed a data-generating protocol with two
main components. 16 The ﬁrst component involved a village
meeting attended by one adult member of every household
in the village (a small number of households were unable to
attend). During this meeting, a list was drawn of all the
non-political groups that had ever existed in the village or to
which village members had belonged. This list includes clubs,
religious groups, unions, rotating savings and credit associa-
tions, and funeral societies. 17 One ﬁeld researcher led the dis-
cussion among villagers while others wrote independent lists of
the groups mentioned in the discussion. A master list was then
assembled and presented to villagers at the meeting. It was fur-
ther corroborated by researchers who engaged villagers in side
conversations to collect any additional relevant information.
From this process, we constructed an exhaustive list of groups
that either existed at the time of the meeting or had existed at
some time during the history of the village.
These lists became the code sheet for the next stage of data
collection, which involved the recording of individual
household’s civil social histories. To ensure that the recall is
as accurate as possible, we did not interview household
representatives in isolation but instead constructed a panel
of informants for each household. These panels usually
include neighbors as well as household members. To reduce
time pressure, panel interviews took place while refreshments
were being served at the end of village meetings relating to
other research tasks, or while menial tasks such as shelling
groundnuts or beans were undertaken by groups of neighbors.
This approach proved particularly valuable when the original
settler had died, leaving behind family members too young to
remember the early years of the household’s history. This
approach also allowed us to construct histories for the few
households that no longer resided in the villages.
Generally, we ﬁnd that women in their 40s and 50s were
the most reliable panel members. Men recalled male activity
with a high degree of accuracy, but provided inaccurate data
on the current and past civil social activity of female house-
hold members. The existence of a “year zero”, i.e., a point in
time when the village was created ad nihilo and before which
there was no civil society, provided an important anchor for
the recall exercise. Natural dating techniques, principally
involving references to drought years such as 1992 and
1995, were also used. As a result we have what we believe
is a fairly complete year-by-year network of civil social
activity in each village.
Protocol details notwithstanding, it is important to bear in
mind that we were asking respondents to recall events during
the preceding two decades—in some cases not just for them-
selves but also for absent others. The analysis presented below
thus should be viewed as jointly testing the hypotheses out-
lined above and the accuracy of the data collection. In general
we expect recall errors to introduce noise and reduce power.
The only reason why recall errors may lead to spurious infer-
ence is if respondents ﬁll gaps in their memory with guesses
based on a shared theory. The likelihood of such occurrence
appears slim, however. Recall error is far more likely to inﬂate
standard errors and the estimates presented below should be
regarded as conservative.
Table 11 provides a breakdown of all the CBOs in the data-
set, by village and starting date. The majority of the CBOs,
70%, have members from the village only and less than a quar-
ter of the reported CBOs have connections to external agents
such as NGOs or government. Our analysis focuses on co-
memberships in CBOs serving an economic purpose. These
represent 41% of the CBOs listed in the ﬁfteen villages. They
include funeral societies, ROSCAs, and a diverse range of
agricultural and other income-generating cooperatives aiming
to maintain collectively owned indivisible structures and to
harness economies of scale. They also include activities to
learn and share new skills, most often relating to adult literacy
or agricultural practices. 18
CBOs serving a purely social purpose, such as choirs, dance
groups, and football and netball clubs represent 15% of the
listed CBOs. Tests indicate that recall data on these organiza-
tions are of considerably poorer quality, suggesting that mem-
bership is less important and thus harder to recall. To the
extent that the data can be analyzed at all, social CBOs appear
to follow a diﬀerent formation process. It is therefore safer to
omit them from the analysis. 19 We also exclude religious
organizations, as religious aﬃliation is likely to predate reset-
tlement. 20 Unfortunately, no information was collected on
religious aﬃliation at the time of resettlement, so we cannot
control for it. Religious groups represent 44% of the listed
CBOs.
Each questionnaire used to collect CBO membership data
started with the question “Has anyone from this household
ever regularly attended the meetings of [the name of a group
or association]?” This was followed by a series of questions
about who attended, when the ﬁrst attendee started attend-
ing, and when the last attendee stopped attending. Ques-
tions were also asked about attendance rates,
contributions, and leadership. The precise identity of the
attendees was not collected; we only know whether the
attendees included the head of household, an adult male
or female, or a male or female child. When several members
attended, we do not know who was ﬁrst and last. This pro-
tocol rules out studying individual connectedness. 21 To the
extent that CBO membership and attendance decisions are
taken jointly by the household, household interconnected-
Table 2. Livestock holdings and other characteristics of resettled households
Year n Mean or % s.d.
Livestock holding at time of arrival 493 3.239 5.438
Female-headed households 1980 159 6.3%
1982 444 9.7%
1984 463 9.9%
Age of household head 1980 157 37.732 12.051
1982 436 41.823 12.998
1984 455 43.998 13.053
Size of household (headcount) 1980 159 5.654 2.531
1982 444 6.840 3.128
1984 464 7.517 3.414
Non-Zimbabwean 502 6.8%
Previously lived in a curfew village 468 36.5%
Source: ZRHDS.
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ness is probably a better unit of analysis anyway. For the
remainder of the paper mij denotes the number of economic
CBOs in which households i and j have at least one member
each. Similarly, dij is set to one when at least one member
of household i and one member of household j belong to
the same CBO.
The data on kinship were collected in 1999 and 2001. A spe-
ciﬁcally designed social mapping exercise was conducted using
village focus groups involving at least one representative from
each household residing in each village (Dekker, 2004). Infor-
mation was obtained about the years of settlement, marriage,
divorce, and death necessary to construct a panel of kinship
ties. This information was then combined with marriage and
household roster information from the panel survey and with
a death registry collected separately in 2000 (see Barr & Stein,
2008). The help of experienced ﬁeld researchers was enlisted in
2009 to complete missing information using natural dating
techniques.
In the analysis, the relatedness of households i and j is
deﬁned as the maximum Hamilton’s ratio between any mem-
ber of household i and any member of household j. Hamilton’s
ratio is a measure of genetic relatedness. Marriage relations
are captured as well. In accordance with local tradition, if
the daughter of household i marries an adult male in house-
hold j, she moves into that household. Being related to her
father and mother in household i, the Hamilton’s ratio
between the two households equals 0.5, which is its maximum
possible value assuming no inbreeding. Although a full panel
of kinship ties is available, here we only use initial relatedness,
e.g., the kinship ties between two households in the year of set-
tlement. 22 In the case of inter-marriage, the Hamilton’s ratio
between i and j equals 0.5 if the marriage took place before the
two households had settled in the village.
The lineage data were collected in nine of the villages in
2001 and in the remaining six in 2009. Following consulta-
tions with experienced local ﬁeld researchers, we chose to col-
lect data on the totem of each household head and their
spouse(s). In the study area, someone’s totem is made of
three elements: their Mutupo, Chidao, and Dzinza. These
terms refer to the patrilineal clan, subclan, and subsection
of the subclan, respectively. Both Mutupo and Chidao have
religious and symbolic connotations. Someone’s Dzinza sim-
ply traces their family roots and refers to the fourth male
ancestor up the family tree (Bourdillon, 1976). It also indi-
cates the geographical location of the clan lands upon which
an individual’s great-grand parents lived. In the analysis
below, we use the Dzinza as a lineage variable. More specif-
ically, household i is deﬁned as having a shared lineage with
household j if household i’s head’s or spouses’ Dzinza
matches household j’s head’s or spouses’ Dzinza. This cap-
tures co-membership in a broad family network. Given the
lack of close kinship ties in the resettled villages, this broad
family network could provide a sense of shared identity
and facilitate the provision of hospitality and support
(Spierenburg, 2003; Stead, 1946). This exercise also revealed
that almost 7% of the sampled households are of non-Zim-
babwean origin.
For nine of the villages, we had geographical maps sketched
in 1999 as part of the kinship mapping exercises. Originally,
they were not intended to act as a source of geographical data.
But, when we began work on this project in 2009, we returned
to the maps as a source of geographical proximity data. We
approximated the scale of each map using information about
the size of the homestead plots oﬃcially assigned to each
household. Having established that this exercise yielded use-
able data, we dispatched a small team of local researchers to
draw similar sketch maps in the remaining six villages. They
also measured a few key distances to verify the accuracy of
our approximation of the scale of each map. In the analysis
presented below, we use the estimated distance in km between
each pair of households as a measure of the geographical dis-
tance between them.
The following regressors are used in the dyadic regression
analysis:
Table 3. Co-memberships in CBO’s with an economic purpose (average number across dyadic sample, year-by-year)
Year For dyadic population in villages year-by-year For sample of dyads in the regression analysis year-by-year
n % with at least one co-mem. Av. Number of co-mems n % with at least one co-mem. Av. Number of co-mems
1980 4564 43.2 0.512
1981 10,194 53.5 0.669
1982 14,738 53.2 0.687 12,228 55.4 0.728
1983 15,706 57.7 0.958 13,138 58.7 0.986
1984 15,818 60.8 1.082 13,218 60.8 1.088
1985 16,242 62.3 1.132 13,606 62.3 1.140
1986 16,360 66.4 1.234 13,690 66.3 1.247
1987 16,666 68.8 1.319 13,972 68.9 1.328
1988 17,032 68.5 1.311 14,130 68.8 1.328
1989 17,194 67.9 1.324 14,280 68.2 1.342
1990 17,288 68.0 1.314 14,362 68.1 1.330
1991 17,300 69.2 1.323 14,464 69.2 1.338
1992 17,614 73.5 1.360 14,748 73.3 1.372
1993 17,614 74.7 1.371 14,748 74.6 1.382
1994 17,658 75.6 1.422 14,790 75.6 1.436
1995 17,758 77.2 1.502 14,790 77.0 1.509
1996 17,900 78.5 1.526 14,918 78.4 1.535
1997 17,928 79.8 1.553 14,946 79.8 1.560
1998 18,104 81.3 1.682 15,010 82.0 1.710
1999 18,002 82.3 1.826 15,010 82.5 1.848
2000 18,002 83.7 1.971 15,010 83.9 1.987
Source: CBO data.
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o The diﬀerence between household i’s livestock holding at
the time when it settled, and household j’s livestock hold-
ing at the time when it settled.
o The sum of livestock holdings at settlement.
o A dummy equals to 1 if one household is female headed
and the other is not, 0 otherwise.
o The number of female-headed households.
o The diﬀerence between the ages of the heads of house-
holds i and j at the time of settlement. 23
o The sum of the ages of the household heads.
o A dummy equals to 1 if one household is non-Zimbab-
wean, the other not; 0 otherwise.
o The number of non-Zimbabwean households.
o A dummy equals to 1 if one household previously lived
in a curfew village, the other not.
o The number of households that previously lived in a cur-
few village.
o The diﬀerence in settlement date (in years) between
households i and j.
o The sum of i and j’s settlement dates, each measured in
years since the start of the resettlement program, i.e.,
1980 = 0, 1981 = 1, etc.
o The diﬀerence in the size (head count) of households i
and j at time of settlement.
o The sum of the sizes of households i and j at the time of
settlement.
o The genetic relatedness between the two households,
deﬁned as the maximum Hamilton’s ratio between all
possible matched pairs of individuals from household i
and j at time of settlement.
o A dummy equals to 1 if the two households have a
shared lineage or Dzinza.
o The estimated distance in km between the homesteads of
households i and j.
We realize that, in general, the building of new kinship ties
through marriage may be an important predictor of co-mem-
bership in CBOs. In our data, there were no such ties across
households at the time of resettlement. All marriage ties across
study households occurred after resettlement and are poten-
tially endogenous to the CBO formation process we study,
e.g., people may marry someone they meet at CBO events.
Hence conditioning on marriage ties across households could
introduce reverse causation in the analysis. This is the reason
why we do not include marriage ties in the analysis.
4. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Across the 15 villages in our dataset there are 127 diﬀerent
economic CBOs. In any given year, a CBO in existence in that
year includes members from 13 to 15 households. Table 3
summarizes, year by year, the network of co-memberships
deﬁned by these 127 CBOs for the full sample of within-village
household dyads, and for the regression sample for which we
have complete data to estimate dyadic regressions. For these
two samples the table reports sample size in each year, the per-
centage of dyads that share at least one CBO co-membership,
and the average number of CBO co-memberships shared by a
dyad.
We note a steady rise in CBO co-membership over time. In
1983, 58% of the household dyads shared at least one CBO co-
membership. By 2000 that ﬁgure had risen to 84%. Over the
same period the average number of co-memberships increased
from just under one to just under two. There is no discernible
diﬀerence between the full sample and the regression sample.
These numbers are consistent with a high level of CBO activity
and a high degree of interconnectedness. There is considerable
variation across villages, however. Figure 1 plots, for each vil-
lage separately, the evolution of the proportion of household
dyads sharing at least one co-membership over time. We see
that seven villages had a fully connected network of CBO
co-membership by 1984, while ﬁve others had not even
reached a density of 20% and one village had no CBO activity
until 1991. We also note that the ranking of villages in terms of
CBO co-memberships remains fairly stable over time. Figure 2
does the same thing for the average number of CBO co-mem-
berships. This ﬁgure tells a similar story, with each village
assuming a very similar rank to Figure 1.
We wish to identify household characteristics at the time of
resettlement that predict CBO formation both within villages
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Figure 1. The density of the economic CBO network over time, village-by-village.
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and across villages. To study assorting into CBOs within vil-
lages, we need the process of discretionary allocation of set-
tlers to villages (by government oﬃcials) to result in
diﬀerences in household characteristics within villages. To
identify predictors of diﬀerences in CBO membership across
villages this process must also have produced sizeable diﬀer-
ences in the means of household characteristics across villages.
The extent of within-village variation is presented in Table 4,
which reports summary statistics for household dyads. Since
dyads are only computed within villages, each of these statis-
tics represents the average diﬀerence in a household character-
istic across pairs of households residing in the same village.
There are large diﬀerences between households in all the char-
acteristics of interest. We also present the average genetic
relatedness, the percentage of dyads having a shared lineage,
and the mean geographical distance between homesteads. As
anticipated, mean genetic relatedness is very low. Under our
broad deﬁnition, 32% of the dyads have a shared lineage.
Homesteads are a third of a kilometer apart on average. This
distance is short but it is in line with the planned layout of
resettlement villages in which all residential plots are clustered
together. This pattern contrasts with the traditional layout of
Zimbabwean villages where homesteads are scattered around
the village territory and interspersed with arable ﬁelds.
The extent of across-village variation is summarized in
Table 12, which reports village means for the key regressors
of interest, as well as p-values of a Chi square test of equality
of means across all 15 villages. We note sizeable and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant variations in village means for all variables.
5. DYADIC REGRESSION RESULTS
We start by examining the evidence regarding assorting
within villages. Table 5 presents estimated coeﬃcients of a lin-
ear probability model where the dependent variable takes
Table 4. Diﬀerences and sums of livestock holdings on arrival and other baseline characteristics of
household dyads
Variable n Mean or % s.d.
Diﬀ. in livestock holding on arrival 17,450 3.986 5.588
Diﬀ. in age of household head 16,818 14.120 11.026
Diﬀ. in size of household (head count, dyadic baseline) 17,388 3.407 2.863
Diﬀ. in arrival time (1980 = 0) 18,258 1.677 3.210
One female-headed (dyadic baseline) 17,388 0.181 0.385
One non-Zimbabwean 18,160 0.101 0.302
One previously lived in a curfew village 15,712 0.232 0.422
Genetic relatedness (Hamilton’s ratio) 18,258 0.012 0.066
Shared lineage 17,764 32.0%
Geographical distance (km) 18,258 0.336 0.258
Sum of livestock holdings on arrival 17,450 6.346 6.904
Sum of ages of household heads (1982) 16,818 81.992 18.705
Sum of sizes of households (dyadic baseline) 17,388 12.962 4.599
Sum of arrival times (1980 = 0) 18,258 2.949 3.776
No. female-headed (dyadic baseline) 17,388 0.207 0.436
No. non-Zimbabwean 18,160 0.111 0.330
No. previously lived in a curfew village 15,712 0.687 0.819
Source: combined data.
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Figure 2. The mean number of co-memberships in economic CBOs over time, village-by-village.
138 WORLD DEVELOPMENT
Table 5. The relationship between the network of economic CBO co-membership and livestock holdings on arrival, with controls, selected years only
Dependent variable = 1 if dyad shares at least one co-membership in a CBO with an economic purpose, 0 otherwise
1982 1983 . . .1987 . . .1991 . . .1995 . . .1999 2000
Diﬀ. livestock 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Sum livestock 0.004* 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Diﬀ. fem head 0.014 0.005 0.008 0.021 0.031 0.029* 0.025*
(0.021) (0.017) (0.021) (0.023) (0.026) (0.016) (0.015)
Sum fem head 0.002 0.017 0.027 0.030 0.040 0.019 0.016
(0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.046) (0.045) (0.039) (0.036)
Diﬀ. age head 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Sum age head 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Diﬀ. hh size 0.044 0.023 0.021 0.035 0.016 0.016 0.004
(0.034) (0.027) (0.033) (0.033) (0.031) (0.027) (0.024)
Sum hh size 0.029 0.008 0.005 0.008 0.005 0.006 0.005
(0.024) (0.020) (0.022) (0.021) (0.016) (0.022) (0.014)
Diﬀ. foreign 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Sum foreign 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Diﬀ. from curfew 0.020 0.017 0.000 0.010 0.022 0.029** 0.030***
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.022) (0.017) (0.012) (0.010)
Sum from curfew 0.021 0.022 0.027 0.015 0.014 0.009 0.008
(0.029) (0.027) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.019) (0.017)
Diﬀ. yrs settled 0.021 0.020 0.029* 0.027** 0.028*** 0.010 0.007
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006)
Sum yrs settled 0.014 0.018 0.036** 0.018 0.011 0.007 0.002
(0.020) (0.017) (0.016) (0.012) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007)
Relatedness 0.016 0.064 0.070 0.106* 0.004 0.004 0.008
(0.050) (0.045) (0.057) (0.054) (0.051) (0.055) (0.053)
Shared lineage 0.007 0.004 0.019 0.006 0.016 0.024 0.033
(0.022) (0.021) (0.026) (0.027) (0.032) (0.029) (0.031)
Geog. distance 0.055* 0.047* 0.019 0.006 0.051 0.078** 0.097***
(0.029) (0.028) (0.025) (0.022) (0.035) (0.033) (0.034)
Village f.e.s inc. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Village f.e.s sig at 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
R-squared 0.6074 0.6500 0.4783 0.4917 0.2784 0.2433 0.2562
Observations 12,228 13,138 13,972 14,464 14,790 15,010 15,010
Notes: Coeﬃcients and standard errors from linear probability models reported; standard errors (in brackets) adjusted to account for interdependence
across dyads sharing a common element by clustering by dyads; estimations for all years can be found in the Appendix, Table 13; * – sig. at 10%; ** – sig.
at 5%.
Source: combined data.
Notes:  estimated coefficient, year- by -year; - - - 90% confidence interval; see Tables 5 and 13 for regressions. 
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Figure 3. Eﬀect of the dyadic diﬀerence in livestock holding on arrival on the likelihood of having at least one co-membership in a CBO with an economic
purpose.
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value 1 if the two households in a dyad share a least one co-
membership in an economic CBO. Diﬀerences across villages
are examined below. Dyadic robust standard errors are
reported throughout. Because the focus of these regressions
is exclusively on within-village assorting, we include village
ﬁxed eﬀects in all regressions to net out diﬀerences in CBO net-
work density across villages.
To save space, in Table 5 we present estimation results for
selected years only—namely, the ﬁrst two years and the last
years of our panel, plus a few equally interspersed years in
between. We include the ﬁrst two years because it is important
to clearly document the pattern of CBO co-membership at the
time of resettlement. Since key information was collected in
1999 and 2000, we include the last two years to check for pos-
sible artefacts due to survey timing. The estimations for each
panel year from 1982 to 2000 can be found in Appendix
Table 13. Point estimates and 90% conﬁdence intervals for
the most interesting coeﬃcients are presented in Figures 3–7.
Notes:   estimated coefficient, year- by -year; - - - 90% confidence interval; see Tables 5 and 13 for regressions. 
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Figure 5. Eﬀect of the dyadic diﬀerence in number of years in village on the likelihood of having at least one co-membership in a CBO with an economic
purpose.
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Notes:   estimated coefficient, year- by -year; - - - 90% confidence interval; see Tables 5 and 13 for regressions.
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Figure 7. Eﬀect of diﬀerence in sex of household head on the likelihood of them having at least one co-membership in a CBO with an economic purpose.
Table 6. The relationship between economic CBO co-memberships and livestock holdings on arrival, with controls, selected years
Dependent variable = number of co-memberships in economic CBOs that dyad shares
1982 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2000
Diﬀ. livestock 0.002 0.001 0.007 0.002 0.007 0.007 0.005
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.013)
Sum livestock 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.003
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.014)
Diﬀ. fem head 0.055** 0.045** 0.073** 0.067* 0.113*** 0.071 0.110
(0.024) (0.018) (0.033) (0.038) (0.041) (0.066) (0.068)
Sum fem head 0.017 0.025 0.084 0.098 0.140 0.022 0.032
(0.042) (0.043) (0.073) (0.074) (0.074) (0.136) (0.143)
Diﬀ. age head 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Sum age head 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Diﬀ. hh size 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.007 0.007
(0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013)
Sum hh size 0.002 0.006 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.022 0.018
(0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.015)
Diﬀ. foreign 0.082 0.042 0.104 0.202* 0.146 0.106 0.048
(0.050) (0.077) (0.108) (0.103) (0.097) (0.120) (0.126)
Sum foreign 0.038 0.058 0.087 0.156 0.107 0.031 0.029
(0.073) (0.092) (0.122) (0.104) (0.091) (0.086) (0.089)
Diﬀ. from curfew 0.006 0.043 0.017 0.022 0.049 0.004 0.050
(0.038) (0.060) (0.073) (0.067) (0.060) (0.088) (0.103)
Sum from curfew 0.011 0.022 0.014 0.028 0.093 0.083 0.033
(0.048) (0.059) (0.074) (0.070) (0.081) (0.094) (0.104)
Diﬀ. yrs settled 0.038 0.044 0.073** 0.060** 0.049** 0.026 0.024
(0.026) (0.031) (0.032) (0.026) (0.020) (0.023) (0.025)
Sum yrs settled 0.047 0.047 0.055 0.023 0.016 0.026 0.023
(0.032) (0.038) (0.032) (0.025) (0.021) (0.029) (0.032)
Relatedness 0.011 0.168 0.180 0.188 0.293 0.279 0.217
(0.099) (0.168) (0.186) (0.176) (0.239) (0.292) (0.292)
Shared lineage 0.003 0.013 0.039 0.021 0.012 0.007 0.023
(0.036) (0.042) (0.075) (0.073) (0.080) (0.116) (0.126)
Geog. distance 0.092 0.120 0.082 0.067 0.193 0.132 0.225
(0.062) (0.084) (0.098) (0.102) (0.127) (0.144) (0.150)
Village f.e.s inc. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Village f.e.s sig at 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
R-squared 0.5744 0.6102 0.4789 0.4944 0.4496 0.3647 0.3272
Observations 12,228 13,138 13,972 14,464 14,790 15,010 15,010
Notes: Coeﬃcients and standard errors from linear regressions reported; standard errors (in brackets) adjusted to account for interdependence across
dyads sharing a common element by clustering by dyads; * – sig. at 10%; ** – sig. at 5%; *** – sig. at 1%.
Source: combined data.
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Table 6 presents similar regression results, for the same sub-
set of years, using the number of co-memberships as the depen-
dent variable. The full set of regression results can be found in
Appendix Table 14. Year-by-year point estimates and 90%
conﬁdence intervals for two of the regressors are presented
in Figures 8 and 9.
With respect to livestock holdings at resettlement, Table 5
and Figure 3 show that households with diﬀerent livestock
wealth at the time of resettlement were as likely as households
with similar livestock wealth to be co-members in CBOs.
Table 5 and Figure 4 show that, in 1982, households with
more livestock were more likely to belong to a CBO than their
poorer neighbors. However, by 1983 this eﬀect had disap-
peared and, from then on, the coeﬃcient on the sum of initial
livestock holdings remains close to 0 and statistically non-sig-
niﬁcant. Further, this eﬀect is not observed in Table 6, in
which the number of co-memberships is the dependent vari-
able. Taken together, these ﬁndings contradict the hypothesis
that CBO formation in resettled villages was elitist. The narra-
tive that seems to best ﬁt the fact is that better oﬀ resettled
households set up some economic CBOs upon arrival and that
poorer households joined these CBOs shortly thereafter. Why
it is richer households that set up the ﬁrst village CBOs is not
entirely clear, but one possibility is that poorer settlers, having
just survived the war, had to focus on survival and were not in
a position to set up anything. Once established in their new vil-
lage, however, they were rapidly allowed to join existing CBOs
as and when their circumstances allowed, so that, over time,
initial wealth has no predictive power on CBO membership.
We would not have expected to ﬁnd this pattern if club mem-
bership had served, through segregation and prejudice, to
freeze the socio-economic diﬀerentiation present at the time
of resettlement.
Table 5 and Figure 5 show that, from 1986 to 1998, house-
holds are more likely to belong to the same CBO if they settled
at around the same time. This eﬀect is observed only seven
years after the resettlement program started, suggesting that
it is driven by the few households who resettled very late. As
time passes, the eﬀect remains and is estimated with increasing
precision, but it declines in magnitude and loses its statistical
signiﬁcance in 1999 and 2000. The same story is told in Table 6,
where the number of co-memberships is the dependent vari-
able. Tables 5 and 6 also show that, around 1987 (the eﬀect
is also observed in 1986 and 1988), late settlers were more
likely than early settlers to be CBO members. Taken together,
these ﬁndings suggest that late settlers either responded to
being excluded from pre-existing CBOs by setting up their
own but this, almost competitive, response was short lived;
or never wished to belong to early settler CBOs and set up
their own CBOs with initially considerable—but waning—
enthusiasm.
Table 5 and Figure 6 show that, in 1982 and 1983, more geo-
graphically proximate households were more likely to share at
least one co-membership. This eﬀect, however, vanished over
time, a ﬁnding in accordance with Gans (1968) and
Michaelson (1976). However, the eﬀect reappears in 1997
Notes:   estimated coefficient, year- by -year; - - - 90% confidence interval; see Tables 6 and 14 for regressions.
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Figure 8. Eﬀect of diﬀerence in sex of household head on the number of co-memberships in CBOs with an economic purpose that a household dyad shares.
Notes:   estimated coefficient, year- by -year; - - - 90% confidence interval; see Tables 6 and 14 for regressions.
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Figure 9. Eﬀect of both household heads being female on the number of co-memberships in CBOs with an economic purpose that a household dyad shares.
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and grows stronger during 1997–2000. Could this be due to the
increased political polarization that was growing during that
period? We cannot tell.
One of the most heartening eﬀects identiﬁed by our analysis
relates to the gender of the household heads. Table 6 and Fig-
ure 8 show that households with heads of diﬀerent gender on
average share more rather than fewer co-memberships. This
eﬀect persists even when, from 1992–97, female-headed
households, on average, appear to be less well connected via
the CBO network (see Figure 9). While the corresponding
coeﬃcient in Table 5 and Figure 7 is always positive, it is
rarely signiﬁcant. We do not know why female-headed house-
holds were treated favorably in the study area. One possible
conjecture is that the intervention of the government and the
link between the resettlement program and the war (and thus
widowhood) created an atmosphere more welcoming toward
female-headed households.
Pooling data across years increases power and can, thereby,
improve inference. To this eﬀect, we re-estimate the model pre-
sented year-by-year in Table 5 using all 19 years of data in a
single regression that also includes year dummies to capture
the eﬀect of the passage of time. However, inferences based
on this regression are valid only if the coeﬃcients on the
regressors are stable across time. To investigate this, we inter-
act each of the year dummies with each of the other regressors
in the model. These interaction terms are jointly highly signif-
icant (p < 0.001) indicating that pooling is not appropriate. 24
We conduct a similar analysis and reach a similar conclusion
for the model presented year-by-year in Table 6. Based on
these analyses, we conclude that inference is best conducted
using the year-by-year results reported above.
6. VILLAGE-LEVEL ANALYSIS
Having discussed assorting patterns within villages, we now
turn to the large and signiﬁcant diﬀerences in CBO network
density across villages. For both Tables 5 and 6, village ﬁxed
eﬀects are always jointly signiﬁcant and explain a large pro-
portion of the variation in the dependent variables. In 1983,
village ﬁxed eﬀects account for as much as 63 (Table 5) and
60% (Table 6) of the variation in CBO co-membership. The
proportion falls to 24% and 32%, respectively, in 2000. Since
we only have data for 15 villages observed over a 19-year per-
iod, we are modest in our ambition of identifying statistically
signiﬁcant predictors of inter-village diﬀerences in CBO net-
work density.
We focus on two village-level dependent variables: the vil-
lage average of dij, and the village average of mij. The ﬁrst is
the density of the village CBO network, i.e., the proportion
of household dyads that have at least one CBO membership
in common; the second is the average number of CBO co-
memberships between pairs of households. 25 Each dependent
variable is deﬁned for each of the years between 1982–2000.
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is useful to go back
over the hypotheses that would be consistent with particular
village-level correlation patterns. First, if wealth varies mark-
edly across villages and wealthier households are more likely
to join CBOs, we expect a positive correlation between the
average wealth of a village and CBO co-membership. Alterna-
tively, if poorer households beneﬁt more from CBOs, we
expect a negative relationship. Second, if shared lineage pro-
vides an alternative foundation for collective action, allowing
villagers to dispense from forming CBOs, we expect to ﬁnd a
Table 7. Village characteristics
Mean s.d. Minimum Maximum
Mean livestock on arrival 3.31 1.41 1.57 6.94
Density of lineage network 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.18
Proportion of households female-headed 0.09 0.08 0.00 0.24
Mean household head’s age 1982 42.33 3.59 37.37 49.59
Mean household head’s age 1984 44.59 3.78 39.37 52.43
Mean household head’s education 1982 5.31 0.98 3.43 7.26
Mean household head’s education 1984 5.23 0.95 3.43 7.10
Mean household size 1982 7.03 0.95 5.38 9.21
Mean household size 1984 7.72 1.02 5.86 9.79
Proportion non-Zimbabwean 0.09 0.08 0.00 0.27
Proportion previously in curfew villages 0.40 0.33 0.00 0.85
Mean genetic relatedness 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03
Village in southerly cluster 40%
Number of economic CBOs in village 1982 2.13 1.64 0.00 5.00
1983 3.13 2.47 0.00 9.00
1987 5.27 3.97 0.00 16.00
1991 5.40 4.31 0.00 18.00
1995 6.27 4.38 1.00 19.00
1999 7.47 5.10 1.00 22.00
2000 7.67 5.16 1.00 22.00
Number of households in village 1982 30.07 10.79 12.00 49.00
1983 31.20 10.60 12.00 50.00
1987 32.13 10.89 13.00 50.00
1991 32.67 11.29 13.00 50.00
1995 33.07 11.50 13.00 51.00
1999 33.33 11.45 13.00 51.00
2000 33.33 11.45 13.00 51.00
Observations 15
Reported means (standard deviations) are the mean of village averages (standard deviations).
Source: combined data.
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negative correlation between CBO membership and the den-
sity of lineage networks in each village.
We start by calculating bivariate correlation coeﬃcients
between our two dependent variables and the village means
of various household characteristics. We consider the large list
of possible correlates, summarized in Table 7. The
Table presents the mean and standard deviation of village
averages in livestock holdings at the time of arrival, and in
the density of lineage networks. It also reports the mean and
standard deviation of village means for: the age of household
heads; the years of education of the household heads; the
household size; the proportion of non-Zimbabwean house-
holds; the proportion of households who resided in a curfew
village during the war; the genetic relatedness in each village;
the number of economic CBOs; the number of households;
and a dummy variable indicating whether the village is located
in the southerly cluster rather than in the northerly cluster.
The last variable proxies for regional diﬀerences in land
quality, in the lineage and region of origin of settlers, and in
the implementation of the resettlement policy and related gov-
ernment programs. The land around the northern villages is
better suited for cash-crop cultivation, while the land around
the southern villages is better suited for small cereals and for
mixed farming.
We report simple bivariate correlations for dij and mij in
Tables 8 and 9, respectively. From Table 8 we note that, for
all panel years, the proportion of household dyads sharing a
CBO co-membership is negatively correlated with the mean
livestock holdings on arrival. The correlation is highly signiﬁ-
cant and the remarkable strength of the correlation is also evi-
dent in year-by-year scatter plots—see Figures 10 and 11 for
1982 and 2000, respectively. In the years immediately follow-
ing resettlement, CBO co-membership is negatively correlated
with the density of the lineage network. This relationship is
highly signiﬁcant, but its strength declines over time and is
no longer signiﬁcant from 1996 onward. We also observe
Table 8. Village-level pairwise correlations with density of the economic CBO membership network
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Mean livestock on arrival 0.80*** 0.76*** 0.78*** 0.76*** 0.68*** 0.71*** 0.71***
Density of lineage network 0.70*** 0.66*** 0.65*** 0.63** 0.52** 0.49* 0.48*
Proportion of households female-headed 0.44 0.43 0.41 0.39 0.30 0.20 0.18
Mean household head’s age ’82/4# 0.47* 0.47* 0.46* 0.46* 0.30 0.30 0.30
Mean household head’s education ’82/4# 0.12 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05
Mean household size ’82/4# 0.22 0.18 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.06
Proportion of non-Zimbabwean 0.21 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.08 0.02 0.01
Proportion previously in curfew villages 0.59 0.52 0.50 0.48 0.41 0.39 0.39
Mean genetic relatedness 0.17 0.15 0.10 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.00
Southerly cluster 0.69*** 0.62** 0.62** 0.60** 0.53** 0.51* 0.50*
Number of economic CBOs in village## 0.41 0.21 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.15 0.14
Number of households in village## 0.09 0.12 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.03
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Mean livestock on arrival 0.69*** 0.69*** 0.70*** 0.80*** 0.78*** 0.79*** 0.80***
Density of lineage network 0.47* 0.46* 0.43 0.49* 0.50* 0.50* 0.46*
Proportion of households female headed 0.16 0.15 0.09 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.14
Mean household head’s age ’82/4# 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.39 0.39 0.44 0.46*
Mean household head’s education ’82/4# 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.05
Mean household size ’82/4# 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.06
Proportion non-Zimbabwean 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.07
Proportion previously in curfew villages 0.38 0.38 0.35 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.37
Mean genetic relatedness 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.01
Southerly cluster 0.50* 0.49* 0.46* 0.49* 0.50* 0.49* 0.46*
Number of economic CBOs in village## 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.03 0.14 0.12 0.07
Number of households in village## 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.08
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Mean livestock on arrival 0.77*** 0.78*** 0.77*** 0.75*** 0.75***
Density of lineage network 0.42 0.39 0.36 0.32 0.23
Proportion of households female-headed 0.11 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.04
Mean household head’s age ’82/4# 0.46* 0.52** 0.51* 0.49* 0.54**
Mean household head’s education ’82/4# 0.06 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.22
Mean household size ’82/4# 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.13
Proportion non-Zimbabwean 0.10 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.25
Proportion previously in curfew villages 0.33 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.17
Mean genetic relatedness 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.16
Southerly cluster 0.42 0.38 0.37 0.35 0.25
Number of economic CBOs in village## 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.13
Number of households in village## 0.09 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.24
Notes: n = 15 in every case; * – sig. at 10%; ** – sig. at 5%; *** – sig. at 1%.
Source: village-level data.
# 1982 mean used in correlations with density of the network in 1982 and 1983, 1884 used in correlations with density of the network in 1984 to 2000.
##The number used in each correlation relates to the same year as the density of the network.
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signiﬁcantly less CBO co-membership in the southerly cluster,
but only until 1996. CBO co-membership is also negatively
correlated with the average age of household heads, but only
at the beginning and the end of the study period.
For the average number of CBO co-memberships Table 9
shows similar but, generally, weaker correlations. In all years
the number CBO co-memberships is negatively correlated with
mean livestock holdings at resettlement, but in later years the
correlation is only signiﬁcant at the 10% level. The negative
correlation with the density of the lineage network ceases to
be signiﬁcant after 1989, and the negative correlation with
the southerly cluster dummy becomes non-signiﬁcant after
1987. The negative correlation with the mean age of the house-
hold heads is absent in the early years but stronger in the later
years.
The negative correlation with the density of the lineage net-
work is consistent with the hypothesis that, in these villages at
least, shared lineage and CBO activity are substitutes for
collective action. This accords with reported responsibility
toward clan members and is in line with the earlier ﬁndings
of Barr (2004). The negative correlation with mean livestock
holdings is consistent with the hypothesis that poorer villages
engage in more CBO activity because it is of greater value to
them.
To investigate the robustness of the negative correlation
between the CBO co-membership and mean livestock hold-
ings, we estimate a series of simple OLS regressions that take
the proportion of dyads sharing at least one CBO membership
as dependent variable and include as regressors the mean live-
stock holdings at resettlement, the mean age of household
head, the density of the lineage network, and the southerly
cluster dummy. These regressors are included because they
were shown to be correlated with inter-village variation in
CBO density. One regression is run for each year and the
results are reported in Table 10. 26 The coeﬃcient on average
livestock holdings is signiﬁcant in every regression; the other
Table 9. Village-level pairwise correlations with mean numbers of co-memberships in economic CBOs
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Mean livestock on arrival 0.72** 0.59** 0.63** 0.62** 0.57** 0.56** 0.56**
Density of lineage network 0.66*** 0.52** 0.52** 0.52** 0.45* 0.42 0.42*
Proportion of households female-headed 0.42 0.44 0.47* 0.44 0.38 0.33 0.32
Mean household head’s age ’82/4# 0.37 0.47* 0.50* 0.45* 0.33 0.37 0.37
Mean household head’s education ’82/4# 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.18
Mean household size ’82/4# 0.27 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00
Proportion non-Zimbabwean 0.32 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.03 0.02
Proportion previously in curfew villages 0.54** 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.35 0.35 0.35
Mean genetic relatedness 0.16 0.32 0.18 0.17 0.08 0.10 0.11
Southerly cluster 0.67** 0.46* 0.49* 0.49* 0.44* 0.41 0.41
Number of economic CBOs in village## 0.48 0.41 0.24 0.24 0.28 0.31 0.28
Number of households in village## 0.10 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.18 0.20 0.18
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Mean livestock on arrival 0.55** 0.55** 0.56** 0.57** 0.56** 0.52** 0.53**
Density of lineage network 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.41 0.42 0.40 0.39
Proportion of households female-headed 0.32 0.32 0.30 0.34 0.35 0.37 0.36
Mean household head’s age ’82/4# 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.42 0.42 0.46* 0.47*
Mean household head’s education ’82/4# 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.23 0.22 0.24 0.24
Mean household size ’82/4# 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.04
Proportion non-Zimbabwean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
Proportion previously in curfew villages 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.39
Mean genetic relatedness 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.21
Southerly cluster 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.39
Number of economic CBOs in village## 0.29 0.24 0.24 0.17 0.10 0.13 0.14
Number of households in village## 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.22
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Mean livestock on arrival 0.55** 0.53** 0.48* 0.44* 0.46*
Density of lineage network 0.38 0.31 0.20 0.12 0.06
Proportion of households female-headed 0.39 0.34 0.25 0.18 0.14
Mean household head’s age ’82/4# 0.54** 0.62** 0.64** 0.65*** 0.70***
Mean household head’s education ’82/4# 0.23 0.31 0.35 0.37 0.47*
Mean household size ’82/4# 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.18
Proportion non-Zimbabwean 0.04 0.10 0.15 0.21 0.31
Proportion previously in curfew villages 0.38 0.30 0.23 0.21 0.13
Mean genetic relatedness 0.20 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.12
Southerly cluster 0.39 0.31 0.23 0.17 0.10
Number of economic CBOs in village## 0.10 0.19 0.27 0.36 0.41
Number of households in village## 0.18 0.23 0.30 0.39 0.46
Notes: n = 15 in every case; * – sig. at 10%; ** – sig. at 5%; *** – sig. at 1%.
Source: village-level data.
# 1982 mean used in correlations with mean numbers of co-memberships in 1982 and 1983, 1884 used in correlations with mean numbers of co-
memberships in 1984 to 2000.
##The number used in each correlation relates to the same year as the mean numbers of co-memberships.
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coeﬃcients are never signiﬁcant. We take this as strong evi-
dence of a systematic negative relationship between CBO for-
mation and average village wealth at the time of resettlement.
7. FURTHER EXPLORATION INTO THE EFFECTS OF
WEALTH ON CBO FORMATION
The dyadic analysis in Table 5 revealed that, in 1982,
wealthier households within each village engaged in more
CBO activity, while the poor appeared to be excluded. By
1983 this eﬀect had disappeared, a ﬁnding we interpreted as
suggesting that, when they were ready to join, the poor were
free to join without prejudice. In contrast, the village-level
analysis in Table 10 reveals that, from 1982 to 2000, poorer
villages engaged in more CBO activity, a ﬁnding that is consis-
tent with CBOs being of greater value to the poor.
In a bid to reconcile these two apparently conﬂicting ﬁndings,
we divide the dyadic sample into two sub-samples, one for the
eight poorest villages and one for the richest seven, and we re-
estimate the dyadic regressions on the two sub-samples sepa-
rately (results not reported). This reveals that poorer villages
drive the signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcient for the sum of livestock
holdings. For these villages, a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient is observed
in 1982 and 1983, indicating it was the relatively well oﬀ house-
holds in the poorest villages that were the most active in setting
up the CBOs. Maybe they realized that, as the richest inhabit-
ants in these poor villages, they would be expected to provide
support to others in times of need. Perhaps they saw setting
up CBOs as a way of helping their new neighbors help them-
selves—also reducing their own future burden in the process.
8. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Recent years have witnessed a renewed policy interest in
community-based development and CBOs. The extent to
which CBOs can contribute to eﬀective and equitable develop-
ment strongly depends on where they do and do not emerge
and on their socio-economic composition. Given the cross-sec-
tional nature of most work in this ﬁeld, recent studies have
provided descriptive information on CBO composition. But
they have been unable to satisfactorily address issues of cau-
sality, i.e. whether similarity causes people to associate with
one another, or whether CBO co-membership causes people
to become more similar—and thus whether community com-
position aﬀects CBO formation.
In this paper, we present unique data on the CBO history of
newly formed settlements, the networks of kinship and lineage
ties between villagers, and the characteristics of households at
the time of resettlement. We use these data to investigate who
groups with whom in economic CBOs, knowing that emerging
CBOs could not have had any eﬀect on the initial characteris-
tics of their members, given that villagers had limited prior
knowledge of one another.
In the Zimbabwean villages we study, we do not ﬁnd evi-
dence that CBOs are elitist. True, we do ﬁnd that households
that were wealthier at resettlement were more actively involved
in setting up CBOs, possibly because they had the time and
means to do so. But poorer households joined in when their
circumstances allowed, a few years after resettlement.
In the ﬁrst few years after resettlement, geographical prox-
imity was a determinant of CBO co-membership. The eﬀect
then declined, only to re-emerge in the late 1990s. Although
female-headed households are less likely to belong to a CBO
for some of the study years, they are not excluded (or choose
not to exclude themselves) from associating with male-headed
households. If anything, on average they are more likely to
share memberships with them. People who resettled later tend
not to join existing CBOs and instead appear to set up new
CBOs with other late settlers. Whether this pattern arises
because they are excluded or exclude themselves is unclear.
In the dyadic regressions we ﬁnd signiﬁcantly strong corre-
lation between the village of residence and the likelihood of
CBO co-membership, indicating that villages diﬀer consider-
ably in terms of CBO creation. In a village-level analysis, we
ﬁnd that average CBO co-membership is negatively related
Figure 10. Village-level relationship between mean livestock wealth on
arrival and the density of the economic CBO network (dichotomized) in
1982.
Source: combined data
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Figure 11. Village-level relationship between mean livestock wealth on
arrival and the density of the economic CBO network (dichotomized) in
2000.
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to the mean livestock holdings on arrival and that this eﬀect
persists throughout the two decades for which we have data.
This indicates that villages comprising more poor settlers are
more active in creating CBOs.
With the exception of a positive eﬀect of geographical prox-
imity, we fail to replicate any of Arcand and Fafchamps’
(2012) ﬁndings. We ﬁnd no eﬀect of shared lineage on who
groups with whom, and only weak evidence that the density
of the lineage network aﬀects CBO formation at the village
level. Studying lineage eﬀects is as close as we can get to a con-
cept of ethnicity within our data. This is because the very large
majority of the households in our sample are Shona.
The greatest strength of our analysis is that it is based on
data derived from a quasi-experiment. This being the case,
we can safely assume that the measured characteristics of the
households and villages at resettlement determine the structure
of the CBOs and not the opposite. This causal clarity comes at
a cost, however. By necessity, the study focuses on a special
type of village, those created by government oﬃcials selecting
applicant households and assigning them to a speciﬁc location.
This raises the question of external validity, i.e., the extent to
which our ﬁndings apply beyond the bounds of Zimbabwe’s
resettlement program. We believe that they provide useful
insights—or perhaps points of comparison—for many similar
schemes elsewhere in the world, such as the resettlement of
internal and international refugees, the resettlement of people
displaced by public works projects (e.g., dams) or natural
calamities (e.g., earthquake or tsunami), and the forced villa-
gization policies pursued in some countries.
What, if anything, do our ﬁndings tell us about CBO forma-
tion in African villages in general? Historically, most African
villages were formed when people joined small hamlets spear-
headed by one or two households that settled in the wild. In
many cases, late comers to these communities share ties of
Table 10. Village-level regression analyses of the density of the economic CBO membership network
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Mean livestock on arrival 0.141* 0.141 0.165* 0.154* 0.167* 0.177* 0.178**
(0.067) (0.078) (0.080) (0.082) (0.087) (0.080) (0.079)
Density of lineage network 1.341 3.051 2.803 2.355 1.975 0.599 0.738
(2.798) (3.233) (3.295) (3.375) (3.598) (3.284) (3.279)
Mean household head’s age ’82/4# 0.014 0.015 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.013 0.013
(0.022) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025)
Southerly cluster 0.163 0.097 0.089 0.049 0.127 0.174 0.184
(0.378) (0.437) (0.445) (0.455) (0.485) (0.443) (0.443)
Constant 1.724* 1.838* 1.693* 1.709 0.816 0.731 0.712
(0.855) (0.987) (1.013) (1.038) (1.106) (1.009) (1.008)
R-squared 0.752 0.681 0.689 0.689 0.513 0.541 0.538
Observations 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Mean livestock on arrival 0.181* 0.180* 0.187** 0.168** 0.150** 0.140** 0.146**
(0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.059) (0.057) (0.053) (0.053)
Density of lineage network 0.962 1.005 1.220 0.073 0.310 0.377 0.761
(3.346) (3.332) (3.318) (2.400) (2.326) (2.185) (1.420)
Mean household head’s age ’82/4# 0.153 0.015 0.014 0.008 0.007 0.002 0.001
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Southerly cluster 0.212 0.210 0.206 0.032 0.011 0.001 0.032
(0.451) (0.450) (0.448) (0.324) (0.314) (0.295) (0.292)
Constant 0.626 0.636 0.695 0.971 0.987 1.173 1.229*
(1.028) (1.024) (1.020) (0.738) (0.715) (0.672) (0.665)
R-squared 0.526 0.524 0.525 0.648 0.620 0.638 0.648
Observations 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Mean livestock on arrival 0.138** 0.139** 0.136** 0.126** 0.145**
(0.057) (0.055) (0.054) (0.052) (0.054)
Density of lineage network 0.027 0.127 0.550 1.109 1.287
(2.321) (2.257) (2.197) (2.119) (2.221)
Mean household head’s age ’82/4# 0.001 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.007
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.172)
Southerly cluster 0.016 0.003 0.046 0.110 0.070
(0.313) (0.304) (0.296) (0.286) (0.300)
Constant 1.299* 1.498* 1.444* 1.350* 1.519*
(0.714) (0.694) (0.675) (0.651) (0.683)
R-squared 0.593 0.619 0.608 0.576 0.610
Observations 15 15 15 15 15
Notes: Coeﬃcients and standard errors from OLS regressions (one of each year) presented; * – sig. at 10%; ** – sig. at 5%; *** – sig. at 1%.
Source: village-level data.
# 1982 mean used in correlations with density of the network in 1982 and 1983, 1884 used in correlations with density of the network in 1984 to 2000.
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kinship with the initial pioneers. However, we know that
“stranger” households also join such emergent communities
(see, for instance, Dekker, 2004 on the formation of non-reset-
tled villages in Zimbabwe). Hence, some of our ﬁndings are
likely to be of general interest, especially those relating to
when each household settled in the history of a village.
Other ﬁndings suggest that CBO activity is not elitist and
that even members of female-headed households, a group
often excluded from village life in developing countries, are
not excluded from CBO membership with male-headed house-
holds. This might best be taken as evidence of what is possible
when villages are created rapidly by government oﬃcials. In a
world where refugee status is on the increase, so too are settle-
ments of this type. In the case studied here, the resettlement
program followed a victory over a regime inherited from colo-
nialism. By many of those who resettled, the program would
have been perceived as an opportunity to start afresh and as
the division of the spoils of war in accordance with the socia-
list ideals of the new nation. It is unclear whether resettled ref-
ugees perceive their own predicament in such a positive light.
But they could be encouraged to perceive it as an individual
and collective fresh start.
NOTES
1. This issue is very clearly illustrated by an example, taken from the
work of Snijders (2007): consider social networks among youths and the
decision to take up smoking. Are youths forming links with others who
then inﬂuence them to smoke, or are smokers linking with each other? Put
diﬀerently, does the link cause smoking or smoking cause the link?
2. Resettlement was voluntary and candidate settlers were free to apply
to the government to participate to the program. The government
stipulated the following criteria for resettlement, by order of priority: (i)
refugees and people displaced by the war; (ii) the landless; and (iii) those
with insuﬃcient land to maintain themselves and their families (Kinsey,
1982). Additionally, applicants had to be aged between 25 and 55 years,
married or widowed, and not in formal employment. Challenges to this
formal selection process by groups of squatters have been reported
(Kinsey, 1982), but they do not apply to the villages/schemes in our
sample. Settlers in our sample predominantly come from traditional
villages or curfew villages, with a minority coming from towns,
commercial farms, or outside Zimbabwe (Dekker, 2004)
3. Related household could signal their relatedness when applying and
thereby increase their chances of being assigned to the same village. Also,
our data indicate that latecomers were often related to existing inhabit-
ants, suggesting some self-selection among latecomers (Dekker, 2004).
4. The selection process was random in the sense that households
generally did not self-select into villages, nor did government oﬃcials
deliberately form poorer or richer villages, or villages with more or less
kinship ties among inhabitants. Nonetheless, villages did not have exactly
the same composition when they started out (see Table 12). If fact, in this
paper we show some location speciﬁc diﬀerences in the mixing of
households. What is important for the analysis in this paper is that
households had no or almost no previous engagement with one another
before they settled, and thus could not have become similar because they
were members of the same CBO. To the extent that previous engagement
did exist (e.g., in terms of lineage or kinship ties), we control for it in the
analysis.
5. The theoretical link between kinship and altruism was ﬁrst established
by Hamilton (1964). For non-human species there is now a considerable
body of evidence supporting Hamilton’s hypothesis (Brembs 2001).
6. The P2 Logistic model (Lazega and van Duijn; 1997) is another,
frequently used speciﬁcation. However, it is designed speciﬁcally for the
analysis of directed ties. Co-memberships are undirected by deﬁnition.
7. To see why, suppose that individuals with large values of z join more
and/or bigger CBOs. This implies that E[mij] is an increasing function of
zi + zj and hence that b4 is positive.
8. Ideally, we would have estimated Logits. However, in several cases the
dyadic robust standard errors turn out to be unstable when the Logit is
applied.
9. The 15 study villages were randomly selected during the ﬁrst round of
the ZRHDS in 1983. They were chosen to be representative of agricultural
resettled villages in terms of size and location. The average number of
settlers per scheme was 423 across the 12 schemes from which our two
schemes were selected. The two schemes in our study include 289 and 537
settlers, respectively.
10. Crop cultivation is the main activity in both areas and there are no
farmers who raise livestock only, as is the case in West-Africa (see also
Arcand and Fafchamps (2012) or parts of southern Zimbabwe.
11. Kinsey, Burger, and Gunning (1998), Gunning, Hoddinott, Kinsey,
and Owens (2000), and Hoogeveen and Kinsey (2001) discuss the ZRHDS
surveys in detail.
12. The households were surveyed in 1983, 1987, 1992, 1992, 1994, 1995,
1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000.
13. Note that we do not report on the education of the household heads.
This is because such data is missing for a signiﬁcant proportion of the
households in our sample, 12–40% depending on the year. In many cases
this arises because family members can recall the sex and calculate the age
of a deceased household heads, but never knew their education level. The
data we do have indicate that the average household head had around six
years of education, i.e., had been to primary school.
14. There are no tractors in the villages even today.
15. CBO data were also collected in another seven resettled villages and
six traditional villages. In the former the ZRHDS panel survey only
includes a random sample of households, not the whole population. This
makes the data less suitable for dyadic analysis, given the possible
sampling bias. In the traditional villages, only the year 2000 was
enumerated. Barr (2004) presents a non-dyadic analysis of the full
dataset, focusing on why the resettled villages appear not to be converging
to the levels of civil-social activity observed in the traditional villages.
16. The ﬁeldwork instruments are available from the authors.
17. Owing to the instability of the political environment in Zimbabwe at
the time of the ﬁeldwork, we decided not to ask about political parties—
and to not even record any information about them if they were
mentioned.
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18. We exclude groups that are associated with crop marketing boards
and corporations that supply villages with inputs and purchase their cash
crops because the impetus for their creation is primarily external and they
involve little interaction and require little trust between villagers.
19. The quality of the social CBO data is brought into question by the
ﬁnding that the social CBOs rarely draw their membership from more
than a couple of households and often from only one. Further, co-
memberships in social CBOs do not predict who chooses to group with
whom in a lab-type experiment conducted in 2001 (Barr et al., 2012). We
suspect that the diﬀerence in data quality between economic and social
CBOs is due to the relatively ephemeral nature of social CBOs and to the
importance of the economic CBOs.
20. Initially, we considered including religious co-memberships as a
regressor in the analysis. Unfortunately we do not have data on
households’ religious aﬃliations at the time of resettlement and we know
that at least some individuals changed religious aﬃliation over the study
period. Further, a dyadic analysis of religious co-memberships indicates
that, in the early years after resettlement, they are associated with
geographical proximity. Since the spatial location of resettled households
was exogenously determined, we are concerned that religious co-member-
ship has a strong endogenous element, even though we cannot rule out
that it is partly pre-determined.
21. An analysis of individual interconnectedness is also precluded by the
fact that initial wealth is only measured at the household level.
22. More precisely, in the ﬁrst year in which both i and j had settled in
the village.
23. The time of settlement is the ﬁrst year in which both i and j had
settled in the village
24. A model containing a linear time trend in place of the year dummies
and interactions between that trend and each of the other regressors was
also strongly rejected by the data in favor of the fully saturated model.
25. An alternative approach is to use as dependent variable the estimated
village ﬁxed eﬀects from Section 5. Doing so yields very similar results, so
we omit them here for the sake of brevity.
26. We tested whether diﬀerent results are obtained if we pool the data
across years. Given how similar livestock coeﬃcients are across years, we
do not expect our conclusions to be aﬀected, and this is what we ﬁnd.
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APPENDIX A
See Tables 11–14
Table 12. Village means of baseline household characteristics
vil1 vil2 vil3 vil4 vil5 vil6 vil7 vil8 vil9 vil10 vil11 vil12 vil13 vil14 vil15 p-value F-test
diﬀ in means
Relatedness 0.011 0.004 0.006 0.030 0.010 0.013 0.027 0.007 0.020 0.007 0.003 0.018 0.011 0.011 0.002 0.0001
From a curfew village 0.714 0.593 0.357 0.733 0.600 0.600 0.766 0.606 0.848 0.023 0.043 0.000 0.059 0.063 0.000 0.0001
Foreign 0.071 0.074 0.214 0.267 0.200 0.200 0.085 0.000 0.060 0.023 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.063 0.090 0.0005
Livestock holdings 2.76 2.00 1.84 5.35 1.69 2.70 2.63 2.38 2.74 3.72 3.03 2.99 3.45 4.01 7.25 0.0810
Household size 7.9 7.8 9.6 9.8 9.5 7.8 7.8 7.3 7.6 7.0 5.9 7.2 8.1 7.6 7.2 0.0001
Age head 45.0 41.6 42.9 49.9 43.4 49.5 42.8 43.0 38.9 42.8 40.0 42.6 45.0 53.0 48.3 0.0112
Female head 0.142 0.000 0.070 0.000 0.000 0.040 0.020 0.188 0.032 0.211 0.070 0.060 0.193 0.207 0.050 0.0100
No. of hh with same
lineage in village
6.5 6.6 4.0 5.7 3.1 8.2 18.5 9.9 12.0 10.5 9.0 11.4 9.5 8.8 4.3 0.0100
Source of data: combined data set.
Table 11. Descriptive characteristics of the organisations in the CBO dataset
Category: All villages vil1 vil2 vil3 vil4 vil5 vil6 vil7 vil8 vil9 vil10 vil11 vil12 vil13 vil14 vil15
No. of organizations: 309 13 22 22 11 12 16 21 18 21 38 33 22 22 21 17
Economic 127 3 7 5 3 4 3 11 8 8 23 13 10 13 10 6
ROSCA 48 2 3 2 1 2 2 2 4 4 5 7 5 3 3 3
agriculture 35 1 1 1 – 1 – 4 2 3 8 – 1 5 6 2
Education & health 10 – 1 1 – – – 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 – –
crafts 14 – 1 – – 1 – 2 1 – 5 2 1 1 – –
feminist groups 6 – – – – – 1 1 – – 1 – 1 1 – 1
other 16 – 1 1 2 – – 1 – – 3 2 1 2 3 –
Social 46 3 5 4 0 2 3 4 3 7 3 5 4 1 1 1
cultural 11 1 1 1 – 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 – – – –
sports 20 1 2 2 – 1 2 2 1 3 1 1 2 – 1 1
Education & health 15 1 2 1 – – – 1 1 3 1 2 2 1 – –
Religious 136 7 10 13 8 6 10 6 7 6 12 15 8 8 10 10
Start up period
1980–1987 196 8 18 15 7 7 11 10 12 15 25 16 20 16 17 9
Economic 82 2 7 4 0 2 3 5 4 6 15 4 9 10 9 2
Social 31 2 4 2 0 2 1 2 3 4 1 4 4 1 1 0
Religious 92 4 7 9 7 3 7 3 5 5 9 8 7 5 7 7
1988–1995 46 4 4 3 2 3 3 8 1 3 4 8 1 0 1 1
Economic 13 0 0 0 2 0 0 3 1 1 1 4 0 – 0 1
Social 7 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 1 0 – 0 0
Religious 26 3 3 3 0 3 3 3 0 1 2 3 1 – 1 0
1996–2000 57 1 0 4 2 2 2 3 5 3 9 9 1 6 3 7
Economic 30 1 – 1 1 2 0 3 3 1 7 5 1 3 1 3
Social 8 0 – 2 0 0 2 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 1
Religious 18 0 – 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 1 4 0 3 2 3
Average start up year
Economic 1987 1984 1986 1994 1991 1983 1989 1990 1985 1988 1991 1984 1984 1986 1992
Social 1985 1985 1990 – 1982 1991 1985 1983 1989 1990 1984 1985 1981 1985 1996
Religious 1987 1985 1986 1983 1986 1984 1985 1985 1981 1984 1989 1983 1989 1986 1987
Source: CBO data.
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Table 13. The relationship between the network of economic CBO co-membership and livestock holdings on arrival, with controls
Dependent variable = 1 if dyad shares at least one co-membership in a CBO with an economic purpose, 0 otherwise
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Diﬀ. livestock 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Sum livestock 0.004* 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Diﬀ. fem head 0.014 0.005 0.015 0.016 0.014 0.008 0.011 0.007 0.022 0.021
(0.021) (0.017) (0.015) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.018) (0.022) (0.023)
Sum fem head 0.002 0.017 0.021 0.020 0.034 0.027 0.026 0.011 0.026 0.030
(0.040) (0.041) (0.037) (0.035) (0.039) (0.041) (0.041) (0.043) (0.042) (0.046)
Diﬀ. age head 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Sum age head 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Diﬀ. hh size 0.044 0.023 0.034 0.034 0.017 0.021 0.027 0.030 0.035 0.035
(0.034) (0.027) (0.030) (0.032) (0.031) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033)
Sum hh size 0.029 0.008 0.012 0.016 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.008
(0.024) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
Diﬀ. foreign 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.007** 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Sum foreign 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Diﬀ. from curfew 0.020 0.017 0.028 0.025 0.020 0.000 0.014 0.008 0.007 0.010
(0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022)
Sum from curfew 0.021 0.022 0.029 0.020 0.020 0.027 0.037* 0.033 0.030 0.015
(0.029) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024)
Diﬀ. yrs settled 0.021 0.020 0.010 0.005 0.031* 0.029* 0.032** 0.028* 0.028** 0.027**
(0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013)
Sum yrs settled 0.014 0.018 0.021 0.019 0.036** 0.036** 0.030* 0.023 0.018 0.018
(0.020) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012)
Relatedness 0.016 0.064 0.065 0.103* 0.103* 0.070 0.067 0.073 0.080 0.106*
(0.050) (0.045) (0.045) (0.055) (0.061) (0.057) (0.054) (0.056) (0.056) (0.054)
Shared lineage 0.007 0.004 0.000 0.007 0.020 0.019 0.014 0.017 0.006 0.006
(0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.019) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027)
Geog. distance 0.055* 0.047* 0.035 0.027 0.028 0.019 0.013 0.002 0.007 0.006
(0.029) (0.028) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Village f.e.s inc. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village f.e.s sig at 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
R-squared 0.6074 0.6500 0.6214 0.5999 0.5363 0.4783 0.4733 0.4981 0.4965 0.4917
Observations 12228 13138 13218 13606 13690 13972 14130 14280 14362 14464
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Diﬀ. livestock 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Sum livestock 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Diﬀ. fem head 0.025 0.026 0.034 0.031 0.027 0.036* 0.037*** 0.029* 0.025*
(0.024) (0.023) (0.021) (0.026) (0.023) (0.020) (0.010) (0.016) (0.015)
Sum fem head 0.033 0.044 0.054 0.040 0.038 0.041 0.043 0.019 0.016
(0.045) (0.044) (0.043) (0.045) (0.041) (0.041) (0.038) (0.039) (0.036)
Diﬀ. age head 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Sum age head 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Diﬀ. hh size 0.026 0.037 0.038 0.016 0.013 0.005 0.001 0.016 0.004
(0.037) (0.033) (0.038) (0.031) (0.030) (0.025) (0.022) (0.027) (0.024)
Sum hh size 0.002 0.006 0.009 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.005
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.022) (0.014)
Diﬀ. foreign 0.006* 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Sum foreign 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Diﬀ. from curfew 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.022 0.026 0.026* 0.016 0.029** 0.030***
(0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.012) (0.010)
(continued on next page)
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Table 13 (continued)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Sum from curfew 0.030 0.026 0.025 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.009 0.009 0.008
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.019) (0.017)
Diﬀ. yrs settled 0.031*** 0.034*** 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.023** 0.027*** 0.017** 0.010 0.007
(0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
Sum yrs settled 0.015 0.016 0.009 0.011 0.009 0.014 0.008 0.007 0.002
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
Relatedness 0.058 0.030 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.023 0.004 0.008
(0.055) (0.052) (0.055) (0.051) (0.053) (0.054) (0.045) (0.055) (0.053)
Shared lineage 0.015 0.012 0.018 0.016 0.012 0.026 0.009 0.024 0.033
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.031) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.031)
Geog. distance 0.028 0.034 0.045 0.051 0.049 0.070* 0.077** 0.078** 0.097***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.037) (0.037) (0.033) (0.034)
Village f.e.s inc. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village f.e.s sig at 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
R-squared 0.3281 0.3150 0.2796 0.2784 0.2920 0.2806 0.2681 0.2433 0.2562
Observations 14,748 14,748 14,790 14,790 14,918 14,946 15,010 15,010 15,010
Notes: Coeﬃcients and standard errors from linear probability models reported; standard errors (in brackets) adjusted to account for interdependence
across dyads sharing a common element by clustering by dyads; * – sig. at 10%; ** – sig. at 5%.
Source: combined data.
Table 14. The relationship between economic CBO co-memberships and livestock holdings on arrival, with controls
Dependent variable = number of co-memberships in economic CBOs that dyad shares
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Diﬀ. livestock 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Sum livestock 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Diﬀ. fem head 0.055** 0.045** 0.057** 0.061** 0.076*** 0.073** 0.062** 0.068* 0.076** 0.067*
(0.024) (0.018) (0.025) (0.029) (0.029) (0.033) (0.029) (0.036) (0.036) (0.038)
Sum fem head 0.017 0.025 0.056 0.047 0.069 0.084 0.071 0.074 0.088 0.098
(0.042) (0.043) (0.052) (0.056) (0.065) (0.073) (0.075) (0.073) (0.070) (0.074)
Diﬀ. age head 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Sum age head 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Diﬀ. hh size 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Sum hh size 0.002 0.006 0.006 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.013 0.011 0.013 0.012
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Diﬀ. foreign 0.082 0.042 0.161* 0.171 0.096 0.104 0.134 0.145 0.161 0.202*
(0.050) (0.077) (0.083) (0.085) (0.092) (0.108) (0.109) (0.109) (0.108) (0.103)
Sum foreign 0.038 0.058 0.136 0.145 0.099 0.087 0.076 0.094 0.097 0.156
(0.073) (0.092) (0.101) (0.099) (0.119) (0.122) (0.122) (0.117) (0.115) (0.104)
Diﬀ. from curfew 0.006 0.043 0.057 0.043 0.037 0.017 0.006 0.014 0.014 0.022
(0.038) (0.060) (0.064) (0.065) (0.064) (0.073) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.067)
Sum from curfew 0.011 0.022 0.028 0.008 0.007 0.014 0.002 0.009 0.022 0.028
(0.048) (0.059) (0.063) (0.066) (0.071) (0.074) (0.072) (0.071) (0.070) (0.070)
Diﬀ. yrs settled 0.038 0.044 0.042 0.033 0.071** 0.073** 0.082*** 0.078*** 0.072*** 0.060**
(0.026) (0.031) (0.030) (0.028) (0.035) (0.032) (0.029) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026)
Sum yrs settled 0.047 0.047 0.045 0.038 0.066 0.055 0.046 0.037 0.028 0.023
(0.032) (0.038) (0.038) (0.032) (0.036) (0.032) (0.031) (0.029) (0.028) (0.025)
Relatedness 0.011 0.168 0.115 0.238 0.209 0.180 0.194 0.148 0.144 0.188
(0.099) (0.168) (0.170) (0.172) (0.180) (0.186) (0.176) (0.175) (0.175) (0.176)
Shared lineage 0.003 0.013 0.006 0.001 0.022 0.039 0.034 0.026 0.019 0.021
(0.036) (0.042) (0.055) (0.057) (0.065) (0.075) (0.074) (0.077) (0.074) (0.073)
Geog. distance 0.092 0.120 0.140 0.150* 0.108 0.082 0.068 0.087 0.080 0.067
(0.062) (0.084) (0.089) (0.091) (0.096) (0.098) (0.098) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102)
Village f.e.s inc. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village f.e.s sig at 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
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Table 14 (continued)
Dependent variable = number of co-memberships in economic CBOs that dyad shares
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
R-squared 0.5744 0.6102 0.5794 0.5606 0.5151 0.4789 0.4805 0.4979 0.5006 0.4944
Observations 12228 13138 13218 13606 13690 13972 14130 14280 14362 14464
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Diﬀ. livestock 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.010 0.013 0.007 0.005
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013)
Sum livestock 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.002 0.003
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014)
Diﬀ. fem head 0.079** 0.083*** 0.094*** 0.113*** 0.130** 0.131** 0.125** 0.071 0.110
(0.034) (0.031) (0.028) (0.041) (0.052) (0.054) (0.051) (0.066) (0.068)
Sum fem head 0.111 0.125* 0.136** 0.140 0.141* 0.149* 0.124 0.022 0.032
(0.070) (0.066) (0.067) (0.074) (0.071) (0.083) (0.108) (0.136) (0.143)
Diﬀ. age head 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Sum age head 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Diﬀ. hh size 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.007 0.007
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
Sum hh size 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.012 0.010 0.010 0.014 0.022 0.018
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
Diﬀ. foreign 0.182* 0.193* 0.198 0.146 0.090 0.074 0.105 0.106 0.048
(0.105) (0.104) (0.121) (0.097) (0.101) (0.092) (0.106) (0.120) (0.126)
Sum foreign 0.156 0.144 0.111 0.107 0.092 0.067 0.030 0.031 0.029
(0.098) (0.095) (0.101) (0.091) (0.082) (0.087) (0.094) (0.086) (0.089)
Diﬀ. from curfew 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.049 0.043 0.036 0.004 0.004 0.050
(0.070) (0.069) (0.079) (0.060) (0.059) (0.059) (0.074) (0.088) (0.103)
Sum from curfew 0.007 0.017 0.020 0.093 0.065 0.046 0.086 0.083 0.033
(0.071) (0.072) (0.076) (0.081) (0.078) (0.076) (0.084) (0.094) (0.104)
Diﬀ. yrs settled 0.056*** 0.060*** 0.057*** 0.049** 0.041** 0.047** 0.029 0.026 0.024
(0.022) (0.022) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025)
Sum yrs settled 0.015 0.017 0.010 0.016 0.007 0.017 0.015 0.026 0.023
(0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.029) (0.032)
Relatedness 0.142 0.099 0.149 0.293 0.271 0.279 0.316 0.279 0.217
(0.175) (0.176) (0.183) (0.239) (0.242) (0.244) (0.245) (0.292) (0.292)
Shared lineage 0.039 0.031 0.018 0.012 0.005 0.040 0.018 0.007 0.023
(0.074) (0.073) (0.072) (0.080) (0.081) (0.086) (0.100) (0.116) (0.126)
Geog. distance 0.109 0.102 0.129 0.193 0.158 0.194 0.182 0.132 0.225
(0.106) (0.106) (0.109) (0.127) (0.124) (0.125) (0.138) (0.144) (0.150)
Village f.e.s inc. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village f.e.s sig at 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
R-squared 0.4465 0.4386 0.4590 0.4496 0.4436 0.4378 0.3859 0.3647 0.3272
Observations 14,748 14,748 14,790 14,790 14,918 14,946 15,010 15,010 15,010
Notes: Coeﬃcients and standard errors from linear regressions reported; standard errors (in brackets) adjusted to account for interdependence across
dyads sharing a common element by clustering by dyads; * – sig. at 10%; ** – sig. at 5%; *** – sig. at 1%.
Source: combined data.
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